A Contractor May Still Recover Monies Due For Work Performed Pursuant to an Unenforceable Contract

Despite what might appear to be the parties’ intentions, courts sometimes find contracts unenforceable.  Courts may find contracts unenforceable for any number of reasons including, but not limited to, the contract omitting a material term; the contract having vague or indeterminate terms; the contract violating the statute of frauds; the contract lacking consideration; and/or the contract not reflecting the understanding of both parties.  In those situations, a party that provides labor, materials, and/or services may still be entitled to receive payment for its work under the legal theories of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.

“[U]njust enrichment and quantum meruit are alternative theories of restitution.”  Nation Elec. Contracting, LLC v. St. Dimitrie Romanian Orthodox Church, 144 Conn.App. 808, 814, 74 A.3d 474, 478 (Conn.App., 2013).  “Unjust enrichment applies whenever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract.”  Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 401, 766 A.2d 416, 424 (Conn.,2001).  “Quantum meruit is the remedy available to a party when the trier of fact determines that an implied contract for services existed between the parties, and that,

Beware of No Damages for Delay Clauses

It is common for construction contracts to state that, if the project is delayed by the owner, the contractor shall be entitled to an extension of contract time but will not be entitled to any addition compensation.  Such a contract provision is known as a “no damages for delay” clause.  The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that “‘no damages for delay’ clauses are generally valid and enforceable and are not contrary to public policy. [unless]: (1) [the] delays [are] caused by the [owner’s] bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) [the delays] uncontemplated …, (3) [the] delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract …, and (4) [the] delays [result] from the [owner’s] breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract.  White Oak Corp. v. Department of Transp., 217 Conn. 281, 288-89, 585 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Conn.,1991).  The list of exceptions; however, may not actually be that broad.  In a recent decision, the Superior Court analyzed the applicability of the aforesaid exceptions to a typical “no damages for delay” clause.

In C & H Elec., Inc. v. Town of Bethel, an electrical contractor was substantially delayed because of the additional asbestos abatement work that was required. 

An Explanation of The Home Improvement Act’s Licensed Contractor Exception

Chapter 400 of the Connecticut General Statutes is known as the Home Improvement Act.  “The purpose of the Home Improvement Act is to ensure that home improvements are performed by qualified people.”  Santa Fuel, Inc. v. Varga, 77 Conn.App. 474, 495 (Conn.App.,2003).  A “[h]ome improvement contract” means an agreement between a contractor and an owner for the performance of a home improvement.”  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-419.  As a general rule, a home improvement contract is not enforceable against a homeowner unless the contract complies with the writing requirements of the Home Improvement Act.  Laser Contracting, LLC v. Torrance Family Ltd. Partnership, 108 Conn.App. 222, 226, (Conn.App.,2008).

The Home Improvement Act serves a valid purpose but may be heavy handed in its application.  In holding that the failure to comply with the statutory requirements for a home improvement contract bars all recovery, including claims sounding in implied contract and unjust enrichment, the Connecticut Supreme Court said the following:

We recognize that our decision may lead to a harsh result where a contractor in good faith but in ignorance of the law performs valuable home improvements without complying with § 20-429. 

It is Not Always Clear Cut Which Services May Be the Basis of a Mechanic’s Lien

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-33 provides that those furnishing labor, materials or services for the improvement of real property are entitled to claim a lien on said premises.  “Prior to the statute’s amendment by the legislature in 1974, our cases construing the language of § 49–33 required, as a condition of lienability, that the work done be incorporated in or utilized in the building (or the appurtenance ) to be constructed, raised, removed or repaired.”  Santa Fuel, Inc. v. Varga, 77 Conn.App. 474, 482, 823 A.2d 1249, 1255 (Conn.App., 2003).  In 1974, the legislature amended Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-33; however, “the 1974 amendment was not intended to expand the scope of [our mechanic’s lien laws] to include persons whose services do not enhance the property in some physical manner or lay the groundwork for the physical enhancement of the property.”  Nickel Mine Brook Associates v. Joseph E. Sakal, P.C., 217 Conn. 361, 363-364, 585 A.2d 1210, 1212 (Conn.,1991).  For that reason, numerous services pertaining to land cannot be the basis for a mechanic’s lien such as pipe removal, temporary electrical work, trash removal, cleaning services, and lawn mowing.  See Landscape Management Services, Inc.

Arbitrators May Amend or Correct Their “Final” Decisions

Arbitration Awards May Be Amended by the Arbitrator

Arbitration is a procedure by which parties to a contract agree in advance that any disputes arising out of that agreement will be submitted to a private individual or a panel of private individuals to issue a final decision referred to as an “award” that is final and binding upon the parties.  Much like a court trial, in an arbitraiton, a single arbitrator or panel of arbitrators will hear testimony and take evidence presented by the parties or their legal counsel and then make findings of fact and law that lead to one party prevailing over the other.

Arbitration has become a very popular dispute resolution procedure in construction contract disputes because of its intended efficiency and finality.  In general, the courts favor arbitration and, as a result, judicial interference in arbitration awards is very limited.  In Connecticut, as in most states, a court will only vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award for a handful of statutory reasons, which do not include re-litigating the matter.  In other words, you cannot convince a court to throw out an arbitration award merely by pointing out the arbitrator made a mistake of fact or law. 

A Connecticut Court Grants Defendant’s Motion To Stay An Application To Discharge Mechanic’s Lien Pending Arbitration

As regular readers of this blog know, a mechanic’s lien provides a contractor with a security interest in the real property where its work was performed.  Because, however, it is not the intent of the mechanic’s lien laws to restrict the free transfer of title of real property, there are two statutory procedures by which an owner may obtain a release of a mechanic’s lien.  Specifically, the property owner may seek to substitute a surety bond for the lien or the property owner may seek an order discharging or reducing the lien.  In CDO Properties, LLC v. Bogaert Construction Co., Inc., Docket No. CV 13-6018411 (JD of New London), the Court issued a decision staying the property owner’s application for discharge of a mechanic’s lien.  Based upon this decision, an owner’s attempt to promptly discharge a lien may be thwarted or delayed by a court and an owner may be forced to live with a lien until after arbitration.

The decision was based upon the Connecticut General Statutes, which require the court to stay any legal proceeding if the dispute is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-409 states:

If any action for legal or equitable relief or other proceeding is brought by any party to a written agreement to arbitrate,

Construction Claims May Come From A Variety of Sources

Most construction claims arise out of the contractual relationship between the parties.  Some arise out of claims of negligence.  There are other situations where a contractor may be held liable for damages that stem from nothing more than having engaged in certain activities.  Such claims are based upon the idea that “strict liability” applies to “ultra-hazardous activities.”  In both situations, i.e. claims based upon negligence and claims based upon strict liability, the first party performs an act or omission that results in damage to the life or property of the second party.  With a negligence claim, in order to be held liable, the first party must owe the second party a duty that is breached by the first party’s act or omission.  For example, if a contractor is working on scaffolding above a sidewalk, the contractor must use reasonable care to make sure that nothing falls on the people below and, in that situation, the contractor would only be held liable if something fell due to the failure to exercise reasonable care and not solely because something fell.  With a strict liability claim, however, all that is required is for the contractor to be held liable is for the contractor to be engaged in the activity that caused the harm.

Understanding Unabsorbed Home Office Overhead

It is readily apparent that – if a project is delayed – the contractor is losing money.  The increased direct costs associated with the labor and equipment on site are obvious. The more complex question arises when considering the effect a delayed project has on a contractor’s recovery of its home office overhead, where “home office overhead” is defined as the cost of the contractor’s main office including, but not limited to, rent, utilities, executive and management salaries, staff, office equipment, office supplies, taxes, insurance, etc.  Everyone intuitively understands that a delayed project increases such costs in the same manner that that delays increase the project’s direct costs but increases in home office overhead cannot be directly correlated to any one project because a contractor typically has several projects with overlapping schedules underway at any given time.  Over the years, courts have attempted to determine the damages necessary “to compensate a contractor for its indirect costs that cannot be allocated to a particular contract for the period during which the government has made contractual performance impossible.”  Charles G. Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 326 F.3d 1376, 1380-1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  “As a result, there are at least nine formulas that have been used,

Connecticut Statutes Provide Assistance with Receiving Prompt Payment on Public and Private Construction Projects

Under Connecticut law, an owner should pay its general contractor within 30 days of having received the general contractor’s application for payment; the general contractor, in turn, is required to pay its subcontractors and suppliers within 30 days of having received payment from the owner; and the subcontractors should then pay their sub-contractors and suppliers within 30 days of having received payment from the general contractor and so on down the line.  See Gen. Stat. § 49-41a and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-158j.

The provisions in § 49-41a and § 42-158j are substantially similar except that:

1.) Only private owners are required to make payment to their general contractors within a specified number of days after receiving an application for payment; and

2.) The statute only applies to public projects for which a payment bond is required, which is any public works project whose contract amount exceeds $100,000.

Both statutes also have similar enforcement procedures.  Either a subcontractor on a public project to which the statute applies or general contractors and subcontractors on a private project can make demand for payment by way of registered or certified mail and, within 10 days,

Court Upholds A Mechanic’s Lien Served More Than A Year After It Was Filed

Under Connecticut Law, “a mechanic’s lien shall not continue in force for a longer period than one year after the lien has been perfected unless the party claiming the lien commences an action to foreclose it.”  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-37.  Similarly, “[w]henver a bond has been substituted for any [mechanic’s] lien . . . , unless an action is brought to recover upon the bond within one year from the date of recording the certificate of lien, the bond shall be void.”  Thus, in both instances, the law requires a lawsuit to be commenced within one year of the mechanic’s lien having been recorded or the right to make a claim on the lien or a bond substitute therefor is gone.  In Connecticut, a lawsuit is commenced when the Writ, Summons and Complaint is served upon the defendant by a marshal.  Yet, recently, a Superior Court Judge refused to dismiss an action on a bond substituted for a lien that was not served until after the one year time limit had expired.  See Frank Lill & Son, Inc. v. O&G Indus., 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2844 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2012)

The Lill decision is surprising because it is often said that,